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CAN STUDENTS BE DISCIPLINED FOR OFF-CAMPUS 
CYBERSPEECH?: THE REACH OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Allan G. Osborne, ,Jr., Ed.D 
Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The widespread use of technology in today's schools has 
ushered in a host of legal issues that educators and parents 
could not have contemplated just a few years ago. Within the 
past decade, students have had the unprecedented ability to 
send text messages and instant messages, create websites, post 
blogs, construct Internet profiles, and post messages on 
burgeoning social networking sites, most notably Facebook. 1 
Even when students engage in such speech-related activity off 
campus using their personal computers, their actions and posts 
on such social networking sites as MySpace and Facebook can 
have carryover effects into school and classroom 
environments.2 
The question of whether educational administrators can 
discipline students for Internet postings made off campus has 
been controversial, as evidenced by four recent decisions: a pair 
from the Third Circuit3 and single cases from the Fourth and 
Eighth Circuits. The issue in these cases, which reached 
different outcomes, revolved around the reach of such postings 
into the school setting and how they affected the safe and 
efficient operation of the schools. Given the nature of the 
1. Sec, e.l-f., Mike Swift, Facebuoh Mobile to Rull Out Brand Ads; Strategy Will 
Jimture Spunsured Stories to Link Users, Companies, SAN ,JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Cal.), 
Mar. 1, 2012, at 1 f) (noting that Facebook now has H50 million users). This is 
incredibh· growth considering that Facd)()ok was "born" on Fdlruary 1. 20tH. 
Faceb()oh:~ Timelinf'. USA']'OilAY. Feb. 12.2012, at :m. 
2. For commentary on this issue, see Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the 
First Amendment Ril-fhts uf Public Schuol Students, 2000 BYU. Elluc. & L.,J. 12:1 (2000). 
:1. Martha McCarthy. qyberspeech Cuntruuersies in the Third Circuit, 25H 
EllUl'. L. I{EI'. 1 (2011). Kathleen Conn, The Third Circuit l<;n Bane Decisions on Out-of-
Sehoul Student Speech: Analysis and Recommendations, 270 EIlLJc. L. l{~;p. :iH9 (201l). 
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Internet, this is no easy question and presents school 
administrators with First Amendment Issues never before 
contemplated. 
As these recent appellate court decisions illustrate, 
educational administrators are rightfully concerned when 
students post negative comments about school personnel or 
peers on the Internet for all to see. Litigation has arisen when 
school officials have disciplined students for derogatory, 
defamatory, lewd, and threatening items students have posted 
about teachers, administrators, and classmates on social 
networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook. In 
challenging the disciplinary sanctions imposed on them, 
students have alleged that punishments, such as suspensions 
or loss of privileges, amount to unconstitutional censorship and 
have questioned the rights of administrators to impose 
discipline for off-campus activities. 4 
This Article begins by exploring the First Amendment free-
speech protections afforded to students, along with earlier 
cases dealing with issues concerning their being disciplined for 
online postings and cyber threats. The Article next reviews the 
facts, judicial history, and latest opinions in the four most 
recent Circuit court cases involving online postings targeted at 
both school administrators and students. Finally, the Article 
examines the abilities of school administrators to discipline 
students for making derogatory and false statements about 
school personnel or other students via the Internet or other 
technology, concluding with a discussion about the wisdom of 
these decisions and recommendations for school 
administrators. It is important to recognize that the judicial 
opinions, and thus the focus of this article, are concerned only 
with the right of school administrators to discipline students 
for off-campus postings. This Article does not venture into the 
area of what other recourse educators have to protect 
themselves against the possible defamatory and damaging 
effects of false postings. 
1. ALLAN G. OSBORNE & CHARLES ,J. Russo, THE LE(;AL RIGHTS AND 
nESPONSIBILITIES OF TEACHlms (2011). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In determining whether students can be disciplined for off-
campus conduct involving the use of cyberspace, courts first 
need to ascertain whether the social networking or cyber posts 
in question are protected speech. In doing so, the judiciary 
turns to a line of United States Supreme Court cases on 
student speech in general. As with speech in more traditional 
educational contexts, an important factor that courts examine 
is whether Internet po stings caused, or had a reasonable 
potential to cause, substantial disruptions in schools.5 
The First Amendment includes some of the basic rights 
guaranteed to all individuals in the United States. Accordingly, 
it has been the focus of much litigation in education, involving 
not only the rights of students, but also those of teachers.6 
Even though the language of the First Amendment applies to 
Congress, it has been extended to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment.7 The First Amendment provides that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances."8 
5. For a discussion of related issues, see Ronald D. WenkarL, /Jisruptive 
Student Speech and the First Amendment: How /Jisruptive /Joes it Have to nc(. 2:36 
ElJuc. L. 1{J;:I'. 551 (200S). 
(5. For examples of cases involving teachers' First Amendment rights, see 
Pichring v. Bd. of Educ., :391 U.S. 56:3 (1968); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 129 
U.S. 27,1 (1977); Givhan v. W. Line Conso!. Sch. Dist., 1il9 U.S. 110 (1979); Connick v. 
~1yers, 161 U.S. 1:3S (19S:3); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 517 U.S. 110 (2006). For discussions 
of these issues, see Charles .J. Russo, Social Nrtworhin/{ Sites and the Free Speech 
lli/{hts of School I~mployees, 75 SCH. Bus. AFFAIHS :38 (Apr. 20(9); l{alph D. Mawdsley 
& Allan G. Osborne" The Supreme Court Prouides New /Jirection for Employee Free 
Speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 211 EDUC. L. REP. 157-165 (2007). 
7. See, e.g, Cantwell v. Connecticut, :310 U.S. 29G (1910) (invalidating the 
convictions of .Jehovah·s Witnesses who violated a state statute against soliciting funds 
for religious. charitahle, or philanthropic purposes unless they had the prior approval 
of public officials). But see Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore. :32 U.S. 7 
(1 t::l:3) (holding that the Bill of Rights was inapplicable to the states since its history 
r('vealed that it was limited to the federal government). 
S. U.S. CONST. amend. !. 
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TTl. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON STUDENTS' FREE SPEECH 
RIGHTS 
The Supreme Court's 1969 ruling in Tinker u. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District9 recognized and 
established that students are persons under the United States 
Constitution and have free speech rights protected by the First 
Amendment. Even though the Court drew back on the 
sweeping protections it afforded students, Tinker stands out as 
the first of four Supreme Court cases in which the Justices 
addressed students' free speech rights. Tinker thus set the 
standard by which all courts begin their analysis III 
determining whether students can be disciplined for 
expressions either on or off campus. In its three subsequent 
cases on student expression, Bethel School District No. 403 u. 
Fraser,lO Hazelwood School District u. Kuhlmeier,ll and Morse 
u. Frederick,12 the Court refined, and arguably narrowed, the 
protections it established in Tinker, but left its basic holding 
unaltered. 
A. Schenck u. United States 
Prior to reviewing the four cases on students' free speech 
rights, it may be helpful at this juncture to examine the 
government's ability to limit free speech in general. The 
Supreme Court has essentially fashioned two standards 
addressing state-imposed limits on free speech. In Schenck u. 
United States,13 a dispute involving national security during 
the World War I era, the Court maintained that "[t]he most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."14 In so 
doing, the Court enunciated the so-called "clear and present 
danger" test, contending that "[t]he question ... is whether the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a 
9. Tinker v. Des Moincs Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :39:3 U.S. 50:3 (1969). 
10. Bethel Seh. Dist. No. 10:3 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675 (1986). 
11. Hazelwood Sch. DiRt. v. Kuhlmeier, 181 U.S. 2()O (1988). 
12. Morse v. Fredc'rick, 551 U.S. ::39:3 (2007). 
1il. Schcnck v. United States, 219 U.S.17 (1919). 
11. Id. at 52. 
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nature as to create a clear and present danger .... "15 Thus, 
the clear and present danger test requires more than the 
possibility of disruption in order for free speech to be curtailed. 
Speech cannot be limited unless there is an explicit concern 
that serious harm to the public welfare may follow. However, 
recognizing that the clear and present danger test was not 
entirely appropriate for use in schools, the Court created a 
different measure for schools in Tinker by stating that 
students' free speech could be curtailed only if it caused 
material and substantial disruptions in schools. Before Tinker, 
when students challenged school administrators' exercise of 
control over disruptive expressive activity, courts typically 
deferred to school administrators' judgment. For example, an 
appellate court in California upheld a student's expulsion for 
refusing to apologize for making critical statements about a 
school facility during a speech at a school assembly.16 
B. Tinker u. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District 
The Supreme Court decided Tinker amid the social and 
political upheaval of the 1960s. In its first case on an issue 
directly related to student expression, the Court invalidated 
the policy of a school board in Iowa prohibiting students from 
wearing black armbands to school in protest of the United 
States' involvement in Vietnam. Stating that "[i]t [couldJ 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,"17 the Court attempted to balance the rights 
of students against the recognized needs of educators to 
preserve order and discipline in schools. The Court saw the 
dispute as one "involv[ing] direct, primary First Amendment 
rights akin to 'pure speech,"'IS rather than one "concernringJ 
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or 
the rights of other students."19 In order to prohibit students 
from expressing particular points of view, the Court was 
1 :). lei. 
1 G. Wooster v. Sunderland, 118 1'. 959 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915). 
17. Tinkl'r v. D(~s Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., a9:) U.S. 50:1, 50G (19G9). 
18. Id. at 508. 
19. Id. 
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convinced that school officials must be able to show that their 
actions were motivated by 
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no 
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the 
prohibition cannot be sustained.20 
Hence, the Court declared that disciplining students for 
expression violates the First Amendment unless school 
authorities can show that either a material or substantial 
disruption occurred or that the potential for disruption was 
reasonably foreseeable. 21 
C. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Seventeen years after Tinker, the Supreme Court examined 
the limits of student expression in Fraser, a dispute in 
Washington involving a student who delivered a lewd speech at 
a school assembly nominating a friend for student council prior 
to elections. 22 The speech was laced with elaborate, graphic, 
and explicit sexual metaphors, but did not contain any explicit 
profanity.23 Not surprisingly, the speech caused a substantial 
disruption because some students in the audience responded 
boisterously while others seemed embarrassed.24 The student, 
who ignored warnings from two educators not to deliver the 
speech, was suspended for three days for violating the school's 
rule prohibiting obscene and profane language. 25 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling in favor of the 
student, the Supreme Court held that school officials are not 
prohibited from disciplining students for offensively lewd or 
20. Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Bym:;, :l6:1 F.2d 711. 719 (5th Cir. 19(6)). 
21. For a recent commentary on Tinller and its prog(~ny, see Perry A Zirkel. The 
Rachet's Red Glare: The I,argely Errant and Deflected Flight ()fTinkl~r, :m ,J.L. & EllUl'. 
59:1 (2009). 
22. For a representative commentary, see David Schimnll'l, Lewd Language Not 
I'rotected: Bethel School District v. Fraser, 2:1 ElJuc. L. I{I.:I'. 999 (1986). 
2:1. Bdhel Sch. Dist. No. 10:1 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675. (;78 (l9iJ6). 
21. Id. 
2fl. Id. 
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indecent speech under the First Amendment. 26 The Court 
reasoned that school administrators were justified in 
disciplining the student for violating school rules because he 
delivered the speech after being advised not to do so.27 The 
Court distinguished the speech in Fraser from that in Tinker, 
where the armbands were a passive, non-disruptive expression 
of a political position, rather than a lewd and obscene speech 
incident to a student election lacking in political viewpoint and 
delivered to an unsuspecting captive audience. 28 Recognizing 
the duty of school personnel to inculcate habits and manners of 
civility while teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior, the Court insisted that "ft]he 
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in 
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school 
board."29 
D. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court addressed an issue 
involving school officials' control over school-sponsored 
publications.8o Kuhlmeier arose in Missouri when a high school 
principal deleted two articles-one on teenage pregnancy and 
the other about the divorce of a student's father-from a 
newspaper written and edited by students in a journalism 
class.:31 The Eighth Circuit had held that the student 
newspaper was a public forum for First Amendment purposes 
and that school officials were not justified in censoring the 
articles.:32 
Acknowledging that the newspaper was not an open forum 
either by policy or past practice, the Court agreed that the 
principal acted reasonably in light of factors such as the 
possible identification of unnamed pregnant students, 
20. ld. at 685. 
27. ld. 
28. Fraser, 178 U.S. at 681. 
29. hi. at 68:1. 
:10. For a repreHentative commentary, Hee David Schimmel, Censorship of 
School·Sponsored Publications: Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 15 Enuc. L. I{EI'. 911 (191-\1-\). 
:11. Kuhlmeipr v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1:161-\ (1-\th Cir. 191-\6), rev'd, 11-\1 
U.S. 260 (1988), remanded to 810 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1(88). 
:12. ld. at 1 :)7S. 
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references to sexual activity and birth control that were 
inappropriate for some of the school's younger students, and a 
student's unilateral criticism of her father.33 
The Court distinguished Kuhlmeier from Tinker by stating 
that the issue was not so much the right of students to speak as 
it was the duty of school personnel to not promote particular 
student speech.34 In this respect, the Court recognized the 
authority of school administrators over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive 
activities that could reasonably be perceived to bear a school's 
imprimatur.35 In a split decision, the Court was satisfied that 
the First Amendment is not violated when school personnel 
exercise editorial control over the substance of school-
sponsored expressive activities if their actions are reasonably 
related to valid educational objectives.3n 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court reviewed different 
categories that it demarcated for free speech. The Court noted 
that governmental power to regulate expression is most 
restricted on public property such as parks, streets, and 
sidewalks. According to the Court, the government may bar 
speakers from traditional public fora only when necessary to 
serve compelling state interests and only when doing so by the 
least restrictive means available. 37 The Court added that 
narrowly tailored, content-neutral regulations as to time, place, 
and manner of expression can be enforced, but only if the 
governmental interest is significant and alternative channels of 
communication are open.3S Conceding that the public school 
setting is a special context for First Amendment purposes, the 
Court wrote that school personnel do not need to allow student 
speech that is inconsistent with the school's basic educational 
mission when that speech is sponsored by the school or is part 
of its curriculum.:~9 Further, the Court made a distinction 
between the forum in Fraser and situations where school 
:l:l. Kuhlmeier, 181 U.S. at 271. 
:)1\. lei. at 271. 
;)5. lei. at 281. 
:j6. lei. at 260. 
:37. lei. at 2G7. 
38. lei. at 2G7. 
:39. KuhlmeieT, ·181 U.S. at 2G6. 
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facilities and media are open for use by the general public, 
including student organizations.4o 
E. Morse v. FredericJ( 
In its latest student First Amendment case, the Supreme 
Court further refined the free speech rights of students 
attending school-supervised events. 41 Morse arose when a high 
school principal suspended a student for displaying a banner 
while he was watching an Olympic Torch parade near his 
school in Juneau, Alaska. 42 The principal allowed students and 
staff supervising the event to leave class to watch the parade 
as an approved social activity.4:~ One student was disciplined 
because he created, displayed, and refused to take down a large 
banner which read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," which the 
principal interpreted as advocating illegal drug use. 44 When 
the student challenged his suspension, the federal trial court in 
Alaska granted the school board's motion for summary 
judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in his favor. 45 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and 
rejected the student's claim that he was not engaged in school 
speech, noting that the event was sufficiently associated with 
the school. 46 In finding that the principal's inlerpretation that 
the banner could be perceived as promoting illegal drug use 
was reasonable, the Court relied on Tinker, Fraser, and 
Kuhlmeier in conducting a two-part analysis. 47 First, the Court 
observed that students' free speech rights must be viewed in 
light of the "special characteristics" existing in a school 
environment.48 Next, the Court ruled that Tinker is neither 
absolute nor the only basis on which student speech can be 
10. Id. at 267. 
~ 1. Morse v. Fred(,rick, 551 U.S. :19:3 (2007). 
12. Id. 
1:3. Id. 
1,1. Id. 
1:1. Id. 
1(;. Id. at 108. For rqJfl,sl,ntative commentary on Morse, sec Charks .1. Russo, 
Supreme Court Update: The Free Speech Rilfhts of Students in the United States Post 
Morst' v. Frederick, 19 ETllJc. & L. 215 (2007): .John Dayton & Ann Proffitt Duprt', 
Morse Code: How School Speech Tahes a ("Hon!J'J Hit, 2:3:3 ElllJc. L. REP. 50:3 (2008). 
17. Morse,SS1 U.S. at 108. 
1H. Id. 
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restricted.49 
Noting that its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
understood the important, and perhaps even compelling, 
interest of educators to deter student drug use, the Supreme 
Court ascertained that the principal acted properly in 
disciplining the student for displaying the bannerJio However, 
the Court did reject the school board's argument that the 
principal could have banned the banner under Fraser's "plainly 
offensive" standard, reasoning that doing so would grant school 
officials too much authority.51 The Court instead decided that 
the principal acted out of the school's legitimate concern of 
preventing the student from promoting illegal drug use. 52 
IV. EARLY DECISIONS REGARDING STUDENT CYDERSPEECH 
With technology playing an increasingly larger role in both 
schools and the lives of students, it was inevitable that 
litigation involving cyberspeech would arise. As often occurs 
when new issues arise, court decisions produce different 
outcomes depending on the particular facts of the various 
cases. As can be expected, students have frequently challenged 
disciplinary sanctions for their cyberspeech on First 
Amendment grounds. 53 
A. Discipline Upheld When Cyberspeech Creates Disruptions 
In an early case dealing directly with the issue of student 
cyberspeech directed toward school personnel, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania upheld the expulsion of a student who 
posted negative comments about teachers and suggested that 
the principal had engaged in sex with another administrator. 54 
The record revealed that the student went so far as to solicit 
funds to help pay for a hit man after listing reasons why a 
19. ld. at 105. 
50. ld. at 107, 109-10. 
51. ld. at 108. 
52. ld. at 110. 
53. For a representative commentary, see Duffy B. Trager, New '1hclis for Old 
f)or;": The Tinker Standard Applied to Cyber-Bullyinr;, a8 ,J.I,. & Elluc. 55:3 (2009). 
51. ,J.S. ex rei. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A,2d 112 (I'a. Commw. Ct. 
20(0). 
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named teacher should die. 55 While the court recognized that 
the student's comments were sophomoric and never constituted 
a real threat, it supported the school board's decision since the 
postings resulted in an actual disruption of the educational 
process.56 The teacher who was the target of the solicitations to 
hire the hit man was so distraught by the threats made in the 
postings that she took a medical leave of absence because she 
suffered severe anxiety after viewing the website. 57 Substitute 
teachers were hired to replace the teacher during the duration 
of her leave, causing a disruption of the educational process for 
her students.58 
In two separate decisions, the Second Circuit held that 
school administrators could discipline students for Internet 
postings that caused, or had the potential to cause, disruptions 
in their respective schools. 59 In the first case, the court 
affirmed the long-term suspension of a middle-school student 
from New York who created a drawing and text on the Internet 
suggesting that a named teacher should be shot and killed.60 
Even though a criminal investigation and a psychological 
evaluation of the student indicated that his actions never posed 
a real threat, school officials suspended him after a hearing 
officer found that his postings disrupted the school 
environment.61 The court was convinced that the student's 
po stings constituted a threat that crossed the boundary of 
acceptable free speech and therefore was not protected. 62 
In the second case, the Second Circuit upheld the 
Connecticut federal trial court's denial of a student's request 
for a preliminary injunction to void disciplinary action taken 
against her for posting a vulgar message on her website urging 
others to contact the Superintendent of Schools to protest her 
5Ei. Id. at116. 
56. lei. at ,125. 
57. lei. at ,120. 
()H. lei. at ,117. 
59. Wisnil'wski v. Bd. of Educ. of Wm,dsport Cl'nt. Sch. DisL.. ,191 F.ad :11 (2d 
Cir. 2007); i)oningpr V. Nil'hoff. 527 F.:ld ,11 (2d Cir. 200tl). cert. denied. 2011 WL 
:120,ltl5:1 (Oct. :n. 2011). 
60. Wisnicwshi. ,19,1 F.:ld at :11. 
61. Jd. at :l6-:l7. 
62. Jd. at ;IH-;l~). 
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cancellation of a school activity.6:~ The student's purpose in 
posting the comments was to anger the Superintendent.64 The 
court ruled that the student failed to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits inasmuch as her conduct "created a 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and 
discipline of the school."65 Although the student's request for 
an injunction was since mooted by her graduation, she again 
filed suit seeking damages. 66 The trial court subsequently 
denied her motion for summary judgment, concluding that her 
First Amendment rights were not violated when she was 
prohibited from running for class office because her off-campus 
posting was clearly intended to come on to campus and 
influence other students.67 In the alternative, the court 
determined, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that insofar as 
any First Amendment rights that the student claimed were not 
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, the 
school officials were entitled to qualified immunity.G8 The court 
saw no need to reach the question of whether the student's 
First Amendment rights had actually been violated when 
school officials prohibited her from running for class office. 
A federal trial court in Tennessee upheld the suspension of 
students who created fake profiles of school personnel 
suggesting that the targeted individuals engaged in 
inappropriate behavior with students.69 The court stated that 
the profiles were not parodies protected under the First 
Amendment inasmuch as visitors to the web sites could believe 
that the profiles were authentic.7o 
In an interesting case illustrative of the importance of 
having explicit policies in place to regulate student conduct, a 
federal trial court in Ohio agreed that school officials did not 
violate a student's First Amendment rights by suspending him 
6:1. f)oninger, 527 F.:ld at 11. 
61. Id. at 45, 
65, Id. at 5:1, 
66. Doninger v. Niehoff, 591 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 20(9), (j12 F.:ld :l:H (2<1 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2011 WL :320185:1 (Oct. :11,2(11). 
67. Id. at 221. 
68. Id. at 221. 
69. Barnett v. Tipton Cnty. Bd. of Edne., 601 F. Snpp. 2d 980 (W.D. Tenn. 20(9). 
70. lei. at 9il1. 
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for accessing an unauthorized website on school computers.71 
The student created the website, which contained pictures of 
classmates labeled as losers with lewd captions, on his home 
computer, but then accessed the site in the school's computer 
lab.72 The student was suspended for violating the school's 
code, which prohibited accessmg such sites on school 
computers. 7:3 
B. Discipline Not Upheld Absent Disruptions 
School authorities have not succeeded in disciplining 
students for Internet postings when they have failed to show 
that the offensive material caused a disruption to the 
educational process. In an illustrative Missouri case, a federal 
trial court ruled for a student who posted vulgar and insulting 
comments critical of the school, its administration, and its 
teachers.74 Finding no evidence of actual or potential 
disruption to the school, the court remarked that the fact that 
school officials disliked or were upset by the content of the 
posting was insufficient grounds for limiting the student's 
speech by suspending him for ten days.75 In another case, a 
principal suspended a student for violating school rules 
regarding cyberbullying and harassment of a staff member 
after the student created a group on Facebook and encouraged 
her peers to express dislike of a named teacher.76 A federal 
trial court in Florida asserted that the posting fell within the 
umbrella of protected speech, observing that it expressed an 
opinion about a teacher, but did not cause a disruption and was 
not lewd, vulgar, or threatening. 77 
For the most part, courts have not upheld disciplinary 
actions when educational officials are unable to show that 
student cyberspeech--aeated off campus on home computers 
71. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Schs., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 
2(02). 
72. Id. 
7:1. Id. 
7,1. Beussink ex rei. Beussink v. Woodland 1{-IV Sch. Dist., :lO F. Supp. 2<1 1175 
(E.D. Mo. 199H). 
75. Id. at 11 HO. 
7(j. Evans v. Bayer. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1365. 1:1G7 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
77. Id. at 1:171. 
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or personal devices-reached into school settings to cause 
material and substantial disruptions. In this regard, a federal 
trial court in Michigan found that a student's suspension for 
contributing objectionable material to a website violated his 
First Amendment free speech rights in the absence of evidence 
that his postings either caused a disruption in the school or 
were created using a school computer.78 Similarly, a federal 
trial court in Pennsylvania held that school officials exceeded 
their authority by disciplining a student who had sent e-mails 
from his home computer ridiculing the athletic director. 79 Even 
though the e-mails were lewd and vulgar, given the fact that 
they were not created in school, the court reasoned that 
administrators could not suspend the student in the absence of 
evidence that it caused a disruption.8o 
Another case from Pennsylvania further highlights the 
importance of having specific policies to guide administrators 
in disciplining students for engaging in any form of expression. 
A student who had been disciplined for taking part in an online 
conversation challenged various aspects of the student 
handbook as being unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. 81 
In ruling for the student, the federal trial court stated that 
terms such as "abuse," "offend," "harassment," and 
"inappropriate" were vague in that they were not further 
defined.82 In addition, the court insisted that the school's 
policies were vague in their application and interpretation, 
which could lead to arbitrary enforcement.i,:l The court also 
agreed with the student's contention that the student 
7S. Mahaffey v. Aldrick, 2:lG F. Supp. 2d 779 (KD. Mich. 2(02). See a/so .J.C. ex 
rei. Re. v. Beverly Hills Unifil,d Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 112:5-2G (S.D. Cal. 
2(10) (ruling that school officials lacked the authority to 8lIspend a stmk,nt who had 
postl,d a video clip on YouTuhe since it was cn,ated off campus and did not fl'sult in a 
substantial disruption to the schooll,nvironmlmt). 
79. Killion v. Franklin /{eg'l Sch. Dist., 1 :lG F. Supp. 2d 11G (W.D. Pa. 2(01). 
SO. lei. at 151. See also Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 115, 92 F. Bupp. 2d lOSS 
(W.D. Pa. 2(00) (granting a temporary restraining order to prevent suspension of a 
studl,nt for speech that was created l'ntirely outside of the school's supervision and 
control, l'ven though the intended audience was connectl,d to the school). 
SI. Flaherty v. Keystol1l' Oaks Seh. Dist., 217 F. Supp. 2d ti9S (W.D. Pa. 200:l). 
82. Iii. at 70G. See also Killion , l:lG F. Supp. 2d at 11G (ruling that school 
district's policies against abuse of teachers and administrators was unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague). 
8:i. Killion. 1 :lti F. Supp. 2d at 11ti. 
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handbook was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague to the 
extent that it failed to geographically limit school officials' 
authority to discipline expression that occurred on school 
property or at school functions. R4 
Courts have closely examined situations where student 
speech, whether spoken verbally85 or electronically through 
cyberspeech,86 has been critical of school officials' actions or 
school boards' policies when those criticisms have been 
expressed in vulgar terms. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Indiana invalidated a student's delinquency adjudication for 
posting vulgar remarks about her school's rules banning body 
piercings, holding that the student engaged in protected speech 
that criticized a governmental action and that there was 
insufficient evidence of any intent to harass, annoy, or alarm 
her middle-school principal.87 
V. RECENT CIRCUIT COURT CASES ON STUDENT CYDERSPEECH 
As the above discussion indicates, courts have issued 
seemingly conflicting opmlOns on school administrators' 
abilities to control cyberspeech, especially when that speech 
originated off campus. In these decisions, courts have 
attempted to balance students' First Amendments rights with 
administrators' obligations to maintain safe, orderly schools. 
Even so, the result has left school officials with little guidance 
regarding the extent to which they can regulate student speech 
created using today's technology. Recently, three circuits issued 
four decisions that have shed new light on the controversy. 
Although three of these four decisions were appealed to the 
Supreme Court, the Justices denied certiorari m all 
81. ld. 
tl5. Poling v. Murphy, tln F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989), cat. denied, 1ml u.s. 1021 
(1990) (affirming that officials in Tennessee could discipline a candidat.e for the, 
position of prl'sident of the studl'nt council for making a speech at an election assembly 
that. was disrespectful of school authorities since it included discourte,olls and rude 
n·marks). 
tl6. See, e.g., Doninge,r v. Niehoff, 527 F.ild 11 (2d Cir. 200tl), cat. denied, 1 :32 S. 
Ct. ,199 (2011) (affirming that educational officials could prohibit a stlldcmt from 
running for class office be,callse of vulgar comments that she made about 
administrat.ors on Iwr blDg). 
87. AB. v. State of Indiana, tl85 N.K2d 122:l (Ind. 2(08). 
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instances. s8 
A. Third Circuit: Layshock v. Hermitage School District 
The dispute in Layshock v. Hermitage School DistrictH9 
began when a high school student created a false, unflattering 
profile of his school principal on a social networking site.9o The 
student created the profile using his grandmother's home 
computer during non-school hours.91 In creating the profile, the 
student used a picture of the principal that he copied from the 
school's website. 92 The student gave access to the profile to 
several of his classmates, and soon much of the student body 
became aware of the profile.9;3 At one point, the student also 
accessed the profile on a school computer and showed it to some 
of his classmates.94 Following an investigation, school officials 
suspended the student for ten days, placed him in an 
alternative curriculum program, banned him from attendance 
and participation in extracurricular activities, and barred him 
from participating in his high school graduation ceremony.95 
The student and his parents filed suit seeking, inter alia, a 
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to 
prevent imposition of the penalties.96 In their suit, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the disciplinary actions imposed by the 
school officials violated the student's rights under the First 
Amendment.97 
8H. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v .• J.S. ex rei. Snyder. 1:32 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) 
(denying certiorari for Snyder and Layshoch v. Hermitage School f)istrict); Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Schs., l:l2 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). 
H9. Layshock v. Ihmnitage Sch. Dist., 1\96 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 20(7), rehi; 
en bane gmnted and opinion vacated, 59:l V:ld 21\ 9 (:ld Cir. 201 0), afrd, 650 F.:ld 206 
(:ld Cir. 2(11), ccrt. denied sub nom. Snyder, l:l2 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
90. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., ,112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 501\ (w.n. I'a. 20(6) 
(denying plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order). For a commentary of such 
profIles, see Kevin 1'. Brady, Student-Created Fake Online Profiles Using Social 
Networhing Websiles: Protected Online Speech Parodies or /Jefamution, 21\1\ Elluc. L. 
REP. 907 (2009). 
91. Luyshock, 1\ 12 F. Supp. 2d at. 502. 
92. ld. at 505. 
9:1. Id. 
91\. Id. 
96. ld. 
96. ld. at 506-06. 
97. l_ayshock, 1\ 12 F. Supp. 2d at 505-06. 
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]. Initial Trial Court Decision: Denial of Injunctive Relief 
Following a hearing on the motion for a preliminary 
injunction, a federal trial court in Pennsylvania agreed that the 
educators were justified in disciplining the student.98 In 
denying the student's request for a temporary restraining 
order, the court was satisfied that school authorities had 
presented sufficient evidence that the posting created a 
material and substantial disruption of the schoo1.99 
Specifically, the record revealed that students accessed the 
website so frequently on school computers that officials had to 
shut down the school's computer system for several days, 
causing the cancellation of some computer classes and limiting 
student use of computers for school assignments. IOO Further, 
the school's technology coordinator was required to devote 
considerable time to dealing with the situation and installing 
additional firewall protections) 01 The court also did not find 
that the student would suffer irreparable harm if it did not 
intervene in his behalf.102 
2. Trial Court Decision on the Merits 
Following a trial with a more fully developed record, the 
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
their First Amendment claims. 103 The court acknowledged the 
difficulty in establishing the school's boundaries for First 
Amendment purposes.104 The court observed that the "mere 
fact that the Internet may be accessed at school" does not give 
school officials the authority to discipline students for off-
9S. ld. at fiOS-09. 
99. ld. 
100. ld. at 507 -OS. For cases when, students were disciplined for "hacking" into 
tlw computer systems of their sehools, see Harris ex rei. Harris v. Pontotoc Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 6:15 F.:1d 6S5 (5th Cir. 2011); M.T. v. Cent. York Seh. Dist., 9:n A2d 5:3S (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2(07). appmi denied, 951 A2d 1168 (Pa. 200S). 
101. Layshoch, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 50S. 
102. ld. 
10:1. Layshoek ex rei. Layshock v. Hermitage Seh. Dist., 196 F. Supp. 2d 587 
(W.D. Pa. 2007). The court also grant.ed the school hoard's motion for summary 
judgment on thl' plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. However, since 
the plaintiffs did not appeal this decision during the rehearing, it is beyond the scope of 
this commentary. 
101. ld. at fi9fi-96. 
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campus actions such as occurred in this case. I05 Thus, relying 
on the Supreme Court's student speech decisions, the trial 
court held that, in order to discipline students for off-campus 
speech, school administrators need to show a connection 
between the speech and the material and substantial 
disruption, either actual or potential, of the educational 
setting. 106 However, the court made it clear that any assertions 
of potential disruption on the part of school personnel must be 
well-founded.107 
After reviewing the record and hearing further testimony, 
the court changed its position regarding the school 
administrators' claims that the student's actions created a 
substantial disruption to the educational process. !Os This time 
around, the court determined that the disruption was not so 
substantial as to warrant curtailment of the student's free 
speech rights. I09 The court found that even in the light most 
favorable to the school officials, the plaintiffs failed to establish 
a sufficient causal nexus between the student's off-campus 
actions and any disruption to the school.ll0 Specifically, the 
court pointed to the fact that other false profiles of the 
principal had been created during the same time period, and it 
was not clear that this student's profile was the one responsible 
for the alleged disruption. III Further, the court noted that the 
actual disruption was minimal in that no classes had been 
cancelled and no widespread disorder occurred.112 
105. lei. at 597. 
106. lei. at 599-600. 
107. lei. at 597. 
108. lri. at GOO. 
109. l,ayshoch. !J9G F. Supp. 2d at GOO. 
110. lel. 
111. ld. Although three other false profiles of the principal had bl'en created, none 
of those students was disciplined, presumahly because school officials never learnl'd the 
identities of their creators. 
112. ld. In the trial court's initial decision it stated that the school's shut-down of 
the computer system "caused the cancellation of several classes and interferl,d wi th 
students' ability to use the computers for their school-intended purposes." Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., !J 12 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (W.D. Pa. 200G). In the Third Circuit's 
review of the facts, it sLates that "lcJomputer programming classes wen' also 
cancelled." Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., G50 F.:ld 205, 209 (:ld Cir. 2(11). The 
reason for the discrepancy hetween these statements and the court's finding here that 
no dasst's wen' cancelled is unclear. 
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3. Third Circuit Decisions113 
Upon further review, a panel of the Third Circuit affirmed 
that the suspension violated the student's free speech rights, 
since his posting did not result in a foreseeable or substantial 
disruption of the school.lI4 The court later vacated that 
decision and granted a rehearing en banc in light of a 
seemingly contrary decision issued by another panel of the 
Third Circuit, discussed later in this commentary.ll5 Following 
the rehearing, the full Third Circuit unanimously affirmed the 
trial court's ruling. llG 
In its appeal, the school board did not challenge the trial 
court's finding that a substantial disruption of the school 
environment had not occurred.117 Rather, the board claimed 
that it had the authority to discipline the student because he 
"entered" school property by accessing the school's website and 
copying a picture of the principal to use in his false profile, his 
speech was aimed at the school community, and it was 
reasonable to assume that the profile would come to the 
attention of school authorities.118 The court, however, was not 
persuaded by the board's arguments. 
The court stated that because the school board conceded 
that the false profile did not cause a disruption, under the First 
Amendment, school officials could not stretch their authority 
into the home of the student's grandmother and reach him 
"while he [was] sitting at her computer after school in order to 
punish him for the expressive conduct that he engaged in 
there."119 The court recognized that in today's world, "Tinker's 
'schoolhouse gate' is not constructed solely of the bricks and 
mortar surrounding the school yard."120 To this end, the court 
posited that "[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous 
precedent to allow ... school authorities[] to reach into a child's 
11 :1. Since the Third Circuit's two decisions are almost identical. only the en bane 
opinion is reviewed hpr". 
1 H. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 59:3 F.:1d 219,26:1 (:ld Cir. 2(10). 
115. Id. 
116. Layshoch. 650 F.:1d at 205. 
117. Id. al2H. 
11 H. lei. 
119. Id.at216. 
120. Id. 
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home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that 
it can control that child when he/she participates in school 
sponsored activities."121 The court did not find that the 
student's use of the school website to appropriate a picture of 
the principal amounted to entering the school.122 The court 
also rejected the notion that the profile was aimed at the school 
community and would come to the attention of school personnel 
as the school board claimed.123 Thus, the court affirmed the 
trial court's ruling that the school's response to the student's 
expressive actions violated his First Amendment guarantee of 
free expression. 124 
Much of the school board's appeal rested on its allegations 
that the student's speech was vulgar, lewd, and offensive and 
therefore unprotected under Fraser. 125 Again, the court 
rebuffed the board's argument under the circumstances of this 
case. 126 The court noted that school authorities may punish 
students for expressive conduct that occurs outside of school 
only under very limited circumstances, such as when it causes 
or has the potential to cause a disruption at schoo1.127 Since the 
board conceded that no disruption occurred within the school, 
the court ruled that school authorities were not empowered to 
discipline the student for his off-campus expressions. 128 
B. Third Circuit: J.s. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School 
District 
A second dispute, J.s. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
School District,129 arose in Pennsylvania when an eighth-grade 
honor-roll student created a false profile of her middle-school 
121. Id. 
122. Layshocl/, G50 F.:ld at 219. 
12:1. Id. at 216. 
121. ldat219. 
125. Id. at 21 G. 
126. ld.at216-17. 
127. Id. at 217. 
12S. Layshoch, GiJO F.:)d at 219. 
129 .• J.S. ex reI. Snyder v. Bhw Mountain S~h. Dist., 200S WL 1279517 (M.D. I'a. 
Sept. 11, 200S), reh{; en bane !franted and opinion uacated, 59:) F.:)d 2SG (:)d Cir. 2(10), 
a!rd in part and reu'd in part, G50 F.:ld 915 (:3d Cir. 2(11), cert. denied, 1 :12 S. Ct. lO97 
(2()12). 
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principal and posted it on MySpace. I :30 The false profile, which 
the student created at home on her parents' computer, did not 
identify the principal by name but incorporated his official 
school-website photograph.!31 The profile also contained 
sexually explicit content and vulgar languageY32 Since the 
school system's computers blocked access to MySpace, no 
students were able to look at the false profile at school but 
could access it at home. l :):) After finding out that some of her 
classmates had viewed the profile, the student made it private 
so that access was limited to the twenty-two individuals listed 
as her friends on the social networking site.! :34 Still, the 
principal suspended the student and a classmate who assisted 
her in creating the profile for ten school days.I:35 The student 
wrote a letter of apology to the principal, but her parents 
subsequently filed suit seeking to have the suspenSIOn 
overturned .1:36 
1. Trial Court Decision 
At the trial, school officials claimed that the false profile 
disrupted school since students discussed it in class and that 
the job responsibilities of two school counselors were disrupted 
because one needed to sit in on disciplinary meetings with the 
students' parents while another counselor covered the other's 
scheduled duties. l :37 In unpublished opinions, a federal trial 
court found that the school officials' actions were justified 
inasmuch as they had established a connection between the 
student's off-campus action and its effect on the school.l:3R The 
court pointed out that the website was about the school's 
principal, the intended audience consisted of other students, 
1 :m. Sn'yd~r. 650 F.:1d at 920. 
1:11. ld. at 920. 
I :32. Among other things. the profile dl,picted the principal as a Sl'X addict and a 
jwdophill' who "hit on" parents and other students. The profile also included insulting 
comnwnts about the principal's wife (who also worked at the school) and child. ld. 
I :l:l. ld. at ~J21. 
1 :J.1. lel. 
1 :15. ld. at 922. 
1 :)(). Snyder, ()50 F.:3d at 922. 
1:37 .• J.S. ex rei. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 200H WI. 1279517 (M.D. ['a. 
Sept. 11. 200H). 
1 :lH. ld. 
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the website was discussed at school, the student created the 
profile out of anger toward the principal for disciplining her in 
the past, and there was some disruption during school 
hours. 1:39 Further, the court held that although a substantial 
disruption had not occurred, the discipline was permissible 
because the false profile was vulgar and offensive and had an 
effect on the school.140 
2. Third Circuit Decisions 
A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit initially 
acknowledged that the disruption caused by J.S.'s actions was 
not substantial.141 Nevertheless, a majority affirmed the lower 
court's ruling that her suspension did not violate her free 
speech rights because the profile's potential to cause disruption 
was reasonably foreseeable. 142 Further, the court noted that 
the profile was not created to criticize, but rather to humiliate 
the principal.l4:i To the extent that it might cause suspicions 
about him in the community, the court stated that it could 
undermine his authority.1 44 However, a dissenting judge 
argued that since the speech took place out of school during 
non-school hours and the disruption was not substantial, under 
Tinker, the suspension violated the student's free speech 
rights. 145 Given the apparent inconsistency between this ruling 
and the panel's first opinion in Layshock, an en banc panel of 
the Third Circuit vacated both decisions and granted 
rehearings. 146 
In an eight-to-six decision, the en banc court reversed and 
remanded the finding that the student's suspension for off-
campus speech did not violate the First Amendment. 147 The 
court began by acknowledging that courts struggle to strike a 
balance between safeguarding students' rights and protecting 
1:\9. Id. 
HO. ld. 
H 1. .J.S. ex reI. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 59:\ F.:\d 286 (:kl eir. 2010). 
112. Id. 
11:l. Id. at :316. 
111. ld. at :117. 
H5. Id. (Chagares, Circuit .Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
146. ld. at 286; Layshock v. Hcrmitag(~ S[:h. Dist., 59:1 F.:Jd 249 Old Cir. 2010). 
117. .J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 6,,0 F.:ld 915 (:ld Cir. 2(11). 
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school officials' authority to maintain an appropriate learning 
environment.148 Even so, the court emphasized that Tinker 
sets a standard that is subject to narrow exceptions. 149 One of 
those exceptions, as set out in Fraser, is to regulate lewd, 
vulgar, indecent, and plainly offensive speech in school.1s0 
The court maintained that the student's false profile of her 
principal did not cause a substantial disruption in the school 
and that there was no indication that substantial disruption 
was foreseeable. IS] Concerning a forecast of disruption, the 
court observed that under Tinker, an "undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance [was] not enough to overcome the 
right to freedom of expression."152 Further, the court was of the 
opinion that the profile was "so outrageous that no one could 
have taken it seriously" such that "it was clearly not 
reasonably foreseeable that J.S.'s speech would create a 
substantial disruption or material interference in school."lfi:'l 
Next, the court simply stated that Fraser does not apply to off-
campus speech and could not be used to give school officials the 
authority to punish a student's out-of-school conduct. 154 
Commenting that students' free speech rights outside of school 
are similar to those of adults, the court thus ruled that Fraser's 
standard could not he used to justify the school's discipline for 
the student's use of profanity outside of school during non-
school hours. 15fi 
3. Dissent 
In a dissent, Judge Fisher, who wrote the majority opinion 
in the Third Circuit's initial decision, criticized the court's 
judgment hecause it allowed "a student to target a school 
official and his family with malicious and unfounded 
accusations ahout their character in vulgar, obscene, and 
1 '1il. ld. at. ~l2G. 
l1B. hi. at. B27. 
150. hI. 
151. ld. at B2il. 
1 fi2. Snyder. G50 F.:ld at B2B (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. DisL.. 
:IB:l U.S. GO:l. 50il (1 B6B)) (quot.ation markH omitted). 
15:1. ld. at 9:lO. 
151. ld. at 9:12. 
liiG. lei. 
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personal language."156 The dissent contended that in posting 
the false profile online, the student not only caused 
psychological harm to the principal and his family, but also 
undermined his authority.157 In contrast to the majority, the 
dissent was satisfied that the profile had the potential to cause 
disruption that was reasonably foreseeable. 15R In allowing the 
student's speech to go unpunished, the dissent insisted that the 
speech could disrupt the educational process by interfering 
with the operations of classrooms and the principal's ability to 
perform his duties. 159 Further, the dissent maintained that if 
the student's deeds went unpunished, the court would be 
sending a message to the student body and others that this 
form of speech was acceptable behavior.160 
Responding to the student's claim that the profile was 
intended as a joke, the dissent insisted that school officials did 
not have to treat it as such. In this respect, the dissent 
remarked that the sexual nature of the profile and its 
accusations of sexual misconduct on the part of the principal 
were not matters that should be taken lightly by school 
personnel or the courts.IGl 
C. Fourth Circuit: Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools 
Unlike the two Third Circuit cases reviewed above, the 
underlying incident in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools IG2 
involved harassment of a student rather than a school 
administrator.1G:3 The dispute began when a high school senior 
using her home computer created a discussion group on 
MySpace dedicated to ridiculing one of her classmates and 
invited approximately 100 individuals to join the group.IG4 
Other students, some using school computers, posted comments 
and pictures on the discussion group stating that the targeted 
156. Id. at 911 (Fisher, Circuit .Justice, dissenting). 
157. Id. 
158. Snyder, 650 F.ild at 915. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id.at918. 
162. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sehs., 652 V.:ld 565 (1th Cir. 2(11). 
168. ld. at 567. 
161. ld. 
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student had herpes.l 65 Although the student did not post sllch 
comments herself, she did react positively to the other 
postings.166 The targeted student's parents filed a harassment 
complaint with the school's vice principal after they found out 
about the MySpace postings.167 After determining that the 
student had created a "hate website" in violation of the school's 
policy against harassment and bullying, school administrators 
suspended her for ten days and issued further sanctions 
prohibiting her from attending specified school events for 
ninety days.16S Officials reduced the suspension to five days in 
response to an appeal filed by the student's father.169 
1. Trial Court Decision 
Even though her suspension had been reduced, the 
student's father filed suit claiming that the disciplinary action 
violated her free speech rights. 170 In an unpublished order, a 
federal trial court in West Virginia granted summary judgment 
for the school board, finding that Kowalski's web page was 
created to invite others to engage in disruptive and hateful 
conduct that caused a school disruption. 171 The court concluded 
that school officials were justified in taking disciplinary action 
for the student's vulgar and offensive speech, as well as her 
invitation for others to follow her lead.172 
2. Fourth Circuit Decision 
On appeal, the school board argued that the student's web 
page singled out a classmate for "harassment, bullying, and 
intimidation" and "that it was foreseeable that the off-campus 
conduct would reach the school," thereby creating a substantial 
disruption. 17:3 The Fourth Circuit agreed, commenting that 
school administrators need to prevent and punish harassment 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
1 G7. lei. at 56il. 
1 Gil. Kowalshi. 652 F.:ld at 5G9 (quotation marks omiUced). 
169. lei. 
170. lei. at 569-570. 
171. lei. at 56G. 
172. Id. at 570. 
17:3. lei. at 571. 
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and bullying to provide a safe school environment.174 Further, 
the court emphasized that schools were not required to tolerate 
such conduct, particularly as they attempt to educate students 
about the habits and manners of civility and the fundamental 
values necessary to maintain a democratic political system. 175 
In terms of the web page's reach into the school, the court 
ascertained that the student knew that it would go beyond her 
home to impact the school environment. In this respect, the 
Fourth Circuit observed that "a court could determine that 
speech originating outside of the schoolhouse gate but directed 
at persons in school and received by and acted on by them was 
in fact in-school speech."176 In such an instance, the regulation 
of that speech would be permissible under both Tinker and 
Fraser. Thus, the court concluded that even though the student 
was not physically present in the school when she created the 
web page, it was foreseeable that her conduct would reach the 
school because it was sent to students and those who 
participated were mostly students.l77 Accordingly, in the final 
analysis, the court ruled that since the speech had a sufficient 
nexus with the school, the school administrators' actions did 
not violate the Constitution. 178 
D. Eighth Circuit: D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public 
School District #60 
At issue in D.J.M. ex reI. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School 
District #60179 were the disciplinary measures meted out to a 
high school student who had threatened harm to other 
171. See also In re Kel~lin B .. 27 A.:ld :l89 (N.H. 201 1) (affirming thai l~ducational 
offlcials could suspend a student for sending e-mails including sexually (,xplicit 
languagl' to a principal and teacher undpr thl' naml~ of a pepr and that thp thirty-fimr-
day exclusion was excessive). 
175. Kowalski. (j52 F.:ld at 57:3. 
17(j. fd. 
177. Id.at571. 
178. The court also [wId that officials did not violate the student's dm, proCl'SS 
rights because her lnternet-basl~d bullying and harassment of another studpnt could be 
l'xpl'l:ted to interfere with the rights of that studlmt and thus disrupt. thl' school 
environment. Therpforl', the court was satisfied that she was on notice that 
administrators could rL'gulate and punish hpr conduct. 
179. Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., (j81 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (E-D. Mo. 2(10). 
aff'd sub nom. ILJ.M. ex rei. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. #(jO. (j17 F.:3d 751 (8th 
Cir. 2(10). 
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students in an online conversation with a friend.l8o A student 
and a classmate exchanged instant messages in which the 
student talked about getting a gun and shooting other students 
at the school.1Rl The student was placed in juvenile detention, 
suspended, and expelled after the classmate contacted a 
trusted adult and the police and school officials were notified of 
the threats.182 The student challenged the disciplinary action, 
claiming that it violated his free speech rights.1 83 
1. Trial Court Decision 
A federal trial court in Missouri granted the school board's 
motion for summary judgment on the basis that the student's 
speech constituted an unprotected true threat. 184 In the 
alternative, the court found that school officials could discipline 
the student due to the disruptive impact his behavior had on 
the schoo1.185 The court added that the principal had testified 
that campus security had been increased in response to the 
threats, and considerable time was taken up addressing 
concerns of students and parents. 186 
2. Eighth Circuit Decision 
Upon further review, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court decision in favor of the school board.187 As an initial 
matter, the court, citing its own precedent,188 reiterated that a 
true threat is a "statement that a reasonable recipient would 
HIO. For n,presentative commentary dealing with student thn,ats. see Diane 
Heckman, .Just Kidding: K-12 Students, Threats and First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 259 Elluc:. L. REI'. :i81 (2010); Thomas E. Wheeler, I~essons from IAJrd of the 
Flies: The Responsibility of Schools to I'rotect Students from Internet Threats and 
(~vber-Hate Speech, 21 G EIlUC. L. REI'. :181, 227 (2007); Richard V. B1yst.one, School 
Speech v. School Safety: In the Aftermath of Violence on School Campuses Throughout 
This Nation. How Should School Officials Respond to Threatening Student 
I~xpression(, 2007 BYU. EllUl'. & L .• J. 199 (2007). 
181. Mardis, GH1 F. Supp. 2rl 1111. 
182. Id. 
11:l:l. Id. 
1 H1. lri. at 1119. 
H'5. lri. at 112:1-1121. 
18(i Id. 
IH7. D.J.M. ex rei. D.M. v. Hanniball'ub. 8ch. Dist. #60,6·17 F.:irl 75:1, 762 (8t.h 
Cir. 2(11). 
188. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. :106 F.:lrl 616 (Hth Cir. 20(7). 
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have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or 
cause injury."lR9 The court added that the speaker must have 
intended to communicate the statement to another or a third 
party.190 Since the student communicated his threats to a third 
party, admitted that he was depressed, stated that he had 
access to weapons, and indicated that he wanted his school to 
be known for something, the court had little difficulty deciding 
that his speech was a true threat.191 Since true threats are not 
protected under the First Amendment, and, in view of the fact 
that school boards have an obligation to protect their students, 
the court affirmed that the school officials' actions did not 
violate the student's rights. 192 
Next, the court examined the issue of whether the student's 
threats caused a substantial disruption in the schoo1.19:1 Insofar 
as school personnel spent considerable time addressing student 
and parent concerns about safety and increased security at the 
school, the court was satisfied that a substantial disruption 
occurred.194 Further, the court observed that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the student's threats would have been brought 
to the attention of school authorities and created a risk of 
disruption to the school setting. 19fi The court made it clear that 
school personnel did not need to wait to see whether the 
student's threats would be carried out before taking action. 196 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that school 
settings provide a special context for the First Amendment 
when dealing with student rights. 197 While it concedes that 
students are persons who are entitled to First Amendment free 
IH9. IJ..J.M .• 617 F.:ld at 7(j2 (quoting I)oe. :106 F.:ld at (21) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 761. 
192. Id. 
19:1. Id. at 765. 
191. Id. 
195. IJ..J.M., 617 F.:ld at 766. 
196. Id. at 761. 
197. See Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 5:36 U.S. 822, 827 (2002) 
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of student athl(~tes, noting that special 11l,,~ds 
exist in the, public school context, giving officials greater authority over students). 
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speech rights under the Constitution, the Court also is well 
aware that school authorities must be given latitude in 
maintaining safe and orderly learning environments free from 
disruptions that will have a negative impact on their 
educational mission. Thus, in the past, the Court has sought to 
strike a proper balance between allowing non-disruptive 
student expression and limiting that which can substantially 
interfere with the operation of the schools. In this respect, the 
Court has created a test which allows school officials to curtail 
student speech when it causes material and substantial 
disruptions in schools or has the potential to do so.198 Yet 
questions remain as to what actions constitute material and 
substantial disruptions and what factors make such 
disruptions reasonably foreseeable. At the same time, 
questions persist regarding how much off-campus cyberspeech 
reaches into school settings. 
It is clear from the litigation to date that students may be 
disciplined for off-campus student speech that causes a 
material and substantial disruption in the school setting. Most 
agree that the arm of school administrators cannot extend to 
off-campus activities unless those activities reach and have a 
detrimental effect on the operation of the school. Again, an 
important issue raised in all four of the recent circuit court 
cases on cyberspeech reviewed in this Article is what exactly 
constitutes a substantial disruption. A corollary issue is the 
extent to which off-campus cyberspeech can reasonably be 
considered to have entered the school, particularly in an age 
when cyberspeech can be so easily accessed on the school 
premises via computers and other electronic devices. 
Effective school administrators take actions to quell student 
disruptions before they become substantial. Therefore, 
administrators frequently take proactive disciplinary action 
when they see the potential for disruption. As Judge Jordan 
stated in a concurring opinion in Layshock, 
Modern communications technology, for all its positive 
applications, can be a potent tool for distraction and 
fomenting disruption. Tinher allows school officials to 
discipline students based on a reasonable forecast of 
198. Tinlwr lJ. fJes Moines Indep. Cmty. Seh. IJist .. :l9:l U.S. 50:l. fi09 (1969). 
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substantial disruption, without waiting for the chaos to 
actually hit the haJlways.199 
Unfortunately, the actions of school administrators may be 
second-guessed by the courts after the fact, imposing on them 
the burden of showing that the disruptions were reasonably 
foreseeable. As is often the case, when those actions are 
examined weeks or months later, the potential for disruption 
may seem less obvious than it did at the time of the incidents. 
School administrators thus need to be given some latitude in 
this regard. Courts must understand that they should not 
substitute their judgment for that of school administrators 
unless the administrators clearly overreacted.200 
The cases reviewed in this Article provide a contrast. It is 
unclear why the school board in Layshock abandoned its claims 
that the student's false profile of the principal caused or had 
the potential to cause a disruption. Certainly, as the trial court 
found in its initial ruling, having to shut down the school's 
computer network and cancel classes would be a substantial 
disruption in today's schools where computer and Internet use 
are important tools in the instructional process. In Layshock, 
the disruption likely would have been greater but for the fact 
that the incident occurred just prior to a school break. In J.S., 
the school board also conceded that the disruption to the school 
was minimal, although, as the trial court noted, there was 
some disruption. 
More importantly, in both Layshock and JS., the Third 
Circuit appears to have played down the potential damage the 
fake profiles may have caused to the principals' reputations 
and their abilities to continue to maintain order in their 
schools. In JS., the court incredulously wrote that the fake 
profile was "so outrageous that no one could have taken it 
seriously .... "201 Judge Fisher's dissent responded that the 
199. Layshock ex rei. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.:ld 205, 222 (:ld Cir. 
2011) (.Jordan. Circuit .Justice, concurring). 
200. See B(l. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley. 151l U.S. 
17G. 201l (1982) (denying a sign language interpreter to a student with (lisabilities) 
("We prl'viously have cautioned that courts lack t.he 'specialized knowledge and 
experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difflcult questions of educational 
policy"'). 
201. .J.S. ex rei. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist, 650 F.:ld 915, 921 (:ld Cir. 
2(11). 
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court essentially "allow[ cd] a student to target a school official 
and his family with malicious and unfounded accusations about 
their character in vulgar, obscene, and personal language.''202 
Further, in both Layshoch and J.S., the court seems to have 
ignored the fact that by targeting school officials, the students 
reached into the school setting and had an impact on the school 
environment. One can only wonder whether the judges would 
have been as magnanimous had they been the subject of 
similar postings. 
In the two cases reviewed in this Article involving 
cyberspeech targeting students, Kowalshi and D.J.M., the 
Fourth and Eighth Circuits were quick to recognize that the 
actions of the offenders had a detrimental effect on the 
operation of the school. Oddly, in the two cases where school 
administrators were subjects of the harassing student postings, 
the Third Circuit was not convinced of their detrimental effect 
on the educational environment in the schools. Conversely, the 
Fourth and Eighth Circuits rightfully were cognizant of the 
obligation of school personnel to act quickly when students 
were being threatened, intimidated, harassed, or bullied. In 
contrast, as stated above, the Third Circuit failed to recognize 
that when school personnel are harassed or ridiculed by 
students, especially in a vulgar and demeaning fashion as in 
Layshoch and J.S., it can cause as much harm as when 
students are the targets. 
As Judge Fisher noted in his dissent in J.S., "rb]roadcasting 
a personal attack against a school official and his family online 
to the school community not only causes psychological harm to 
the targeted individuals but also undermines the authority of 
the school."2o:l Further, as Judge Fisher noted, allowing such 
speech to go unpunished not only undermines principals' 
authority, but "demonstrate[s] to the student body that this 
form of speech is acceptable behavior-whether on or off 
campus."204 It is reasonably foreseeable that under these 
circumstances, other students may see that they also can 
attack school personnel in the same manner without fear of 
retribution. 
202. Id. at 911 (Fisher, Cirmit .Justice dissenting). 
20:1. lei. at 911 . 
201. fd. at 915. 
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If school administrators are to fulfill their responsibilities to 
maintain order and discipline in the schools and sustain proper 
environments for learning, they must be given the latitude 
necessary to do so. When administrators take disciplinary 
actions to quell potential disruptions, the courts should not 
second-guess them just because they succeeded in preventing 
anticipated disruptions. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As school boards and administrators face the new 
challenges posed by evolving technology while continuing to 
meet their obligations to maintain safe, orderly, and well-
disciplined environments for learning, it is imperative that 
they develop, implement, and, when necessary, revise policies 
that address acceptable Internet use, as well as harassment 
and bullying. With the widespread use of technology in all 
aspects of students' lives, it is crucial to have policies in place 
that cover both topics. Disciplinary sanctions are more likely to 
be upheld when challenged if they were made pursuant to and 
consistent with policies of which both students and their 
parents were aware. 
In Kowalski, the school administrators suspended the 
student based on the school board's policy against harassment, 
bullying, and intimidation. In its decision supporting the school 
officials' action, the Fourth Circuit noted that this policy put 
the student on notice that such behavior could be punished. In 
developing and reviewing such policies, school officials should 
consider the following recommendations. 
A. Policies in General 
School boards should work with attorneys prior to 
developing policies to make sure that they are consistent with 
federal and state statutes, regulations, and case law. 
At the beginning of each school year, students, parents, and 
teachers should sign receipts acknowledging that they have 
received copies of all policies. This can provide concrete proof 
that students were put on notice that specified violations are 
punishable. 
All policies should make it clear that violations are 
punishable and identify possible sanctions, including loss of 
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privileges and suspenSIOns for more senous offenses. 
Additionally, as reflected in some of the litigation discussed 
earlier, school officials need to distinguish carefully between 
violations that occur in school and those that take place off 
campus so that policies are not struck down as vague and 
overbroad. Based on mixed results to date, the debate over the 
extent to which school officials can discipline students for 
misbehavior that does not originate in school but has an effect 
on the school is one that is likely to receive increased judicial 
attention. 
All policies should be reviewed annually, typically between 
school years, not during or immediately after controversies. 
Revising policies on a scheduled basis affords educators better 
perspectives, and, in the event of litigation, provides evidence 
that educators are doing their best to stay up-to-date in 
maintaining safe, orderly schools while safeguarding the rights 
of all in school communities in the face of rapid legal, social, 
and technological changes. 
B. Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) 
Carefully written AUPs in school settings and on school-
owned computer systems should limit computer access Lo 
legitimate academic, instructional, or administrative purposes. 
AUPs should make it clear that anyone who refuses to sign 
receipt acknowledgements or fails to comply with their 
provisions may be denied access to district-owned technology 
and to the Internet through that technology. 
In devising AUPs, school boards must clarify the 
educational missions of their schools and delineate how 
accessing the Internet supports that mission. Thus, school 
personnel should use their AUPs as instructional tools to teach 
students about the positive uses of the Internet and technology 
while warning about hazards that can come about as a result of 
unrestricted use, such as contacting strangers or losing respect 
for others by accessing pornography. 
AUPs should be differentiated based on student age. In 
other words, AUPs should take into consideration the maturity 
level of the students who will be accessing the technology.205 
20D. For the way in which schools deal with the age of students see Karen 
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To the extent that computers, hardware, and software are 
purchased and maintained with board funds, AUPs should 
contain clear and unequivocal language indicating that use of 
technology can be restricted. By clarifying ownership issues, 
school boards can maintain greater latitude in regulating 
access to and use of equipment. 
In regulating student use of district-owned technology 
consistent with legitimate educational and administrative 
purposes, AUPs should warn against visiting inappropriate 
websites and transmitting materials such as viruses, jokes, and 
the like. 
J\UPs should address privacy and use limitations, such as 
preventing students from using school computers for non-
school related purposes, while clarifying reasonable 
expectations of privacy, especially relating to the sending and 
receiving of messages. As to privacy, AUPs should make it 
clear that computers, or, more properly, their hard drives, are 
subject to random checks for compliance, whether accessed in 
school or from home computers that link into school servers. 
This part of the policy should also warn users against seeking 
unauthorized access to the files of others, especially in such 
sensitive areas as student grades and personnel material, 
while advising users not to share their passwords with anyone, 
including friends. On a related privacy issue, AUPs should 
remind educators that since anything they write on district-
owned computers is subject to disclosure under state public 
records law, they should not put anything in print that they 
would not want the public to see. 
AUPs should make it known that filtering software is in use 
but that it is not foolproof. While educators have legitimate 
rights and duties to limit access to locations such as 
pornographic websites, they must recognize that although 
software in this area has improved, it still has not reached the 
same level of sophistication as the sites they seek to monitor. 
Thus, as school boards consider using filtering packages, they 
should bear in mind that there are three broad types of 
programs, each of which suffers from varying losses of 
Thomas, Tank/I'd Web for Kids, USA TODAY, May 9, 2002, at 1(1) (noting that school 
off1cials start introducing policies for children based on their ages around such 
groupings as 7-9, 10-12, 1 :1-15, 16-18). 
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preCISIOn. The first kind typically lists objectionable sites. 
Software of this type may be helpful, but as sites multiply can 
rapidly become obsolete, requiring constant monitoring and 
updating. The second type of filter ordinarily lists 
inappropriate words and/or phrases. However, problems can 
arise when students are, for example, blocked from obtaining 
material on breast cancer if, as it typically is, "breast" is among 
the words that are screened out. The third kind of software 
rates material in a fashion similar to the way in which movies, 
television programs, and video games are classified. One 
difficulty here may be that ratings are based partly on the 
subjective judgments of evaluators whose perspective may 
differ from those of educators and parents. In response to 
critics who may equate Internet filters with censorship, it is 
important to note that the courts agree that educators have 
discretion to direct the content of school activities "so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns."206 Since courts regularly defer to educators who 
exercise their reasonable discretion in excluding magazines 
from school libraries that, for example, glorify drug use, 
violence, and/or pornography, to the extent that filters are tools 
to assist officials in limiting student access of inappropriate 
I nternet materials, the judiciary is unlikely to intervene. 
C. Policies Addressing Harassment, Bullying, and 
Intimidation 
All policies should: 
Include clear definitions of harassment, bullying, and 
intimidation since doing so puts students on notice as to the 
types of behavior that will not be tolerated. These definitions 
should encompass verbal, written, and electronic 
communications, as well as physical acts and gestures that 
cause physical or emotional harm, damage a bully victim's 
property, put a victim in fear of harm, create a hostile 
environment, infringe on the rights of a victim, or create a 
material and substantial disruption to the school environment. 
Prohibit all forms of harassment, bullying, and intimidation 
on the basis of an individual's race, ethnicity, religion, gender, 
20(). Hazl'iwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. 181 U.S. 2()O. 27:) (1988). 
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sexual orientation, or disability. 
Make it clear that they apply to activities that occur on 
school grounds, property adjacent to schools grounds,207 and 
school buses and at school-sponsored and school-related events 
and activities (whether on or off school grounds), school bus 
stops, etc. 
Include statements covering harassment, bullying, or 
intimidation of school personnel or students via the Internet, 
technology, and electronic devices, whether or not the devices 
used are owned, leased, or used by the school district. Such 
statements should make it clear that students are not immune 
from discipline just because they use their own devices to 
harass, bully, or intimidate others. 
Specify that off-campus behavior is punishable if it creates 
a hostile environment at school for a bully victim, infringes on 
the rights of a victim, or creates a material and substantial 
disruption to the educational process or the operation of the 
school. Care should be taken that this aspect of the policy is not 
overly broad, but covers only areas in which the school has a 
legitimate interest. 
Include prOVISiOns for age-appropriate instruction on 
bullying prevention at all grade levels. 
Contain mandates that all staff report instances of 
harassment, bullying, or intimidation to designated 
administrators either immediately or, if impossible, by the end 
of the school day at the latest. By the same token, policies must 
mandate that administrators thoroughly investigate all such 
reports. Courts have been consistent in finding school 
authorities liable for showing indifference by failing to properly 
investigate and respond to incidents of harassment and 
bullying.208 
207. Statutes or ordinances preventing loitering on school grounds or in the 
vicinity of school buildings are increasingly common. Courts uphold these kinds of 
rules as long as they are not overly vague or restrictive. For such a caSl', see 
Wieml'rslage ex reZ. Wiemerslage v. Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207, 29 F.:ld 1119 (7th 
Cir. Hl91) (affirming a dismissal in favor of school officials in Illinois where pawnts 
and their son sued school officials claiming that his being disciplined for brl'aking an 
anti-loitering rule did not violatl' his rights to free speech, assembly and (hw procl'SS as 
unconstitutionally vague). 
20H. See, e.g., Cebser v. Lago Visa lndep. Sch. Dist., 521 U.S. 271 (199H) (holding 
that a school district can be held liable for damagl's when an appropriatl' person was 
notitll'd of harassment and responded to tbat notice in a dl,lilwratdy inciifferl'nt 
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Make it clear that incidents will be reported to law 
enforcement authorities when there is evidence that a cnme 
has been committed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit cases on student cyberspeech 
demonstrate the challenges courts face in addressing charges 
that school officials have violated the First Amendment rights 
of students. The cases from the Third Circuit provide a contrast 
to those litigated in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits in the 
manner in which the respective courts applied prior Supreme 
Court jurisprudence to situations involving types of 
cyberspeech. Initially, it may appear that the difference lies in 
the fact that courts may not take harassment of school 
personnel as seriously as they do harassment or threats 
against students. However, a closer examination shows that 
differences in the judicial outcomes are more dependent on 
whether the courts interpret student cyberspeech as reaching 
into the schools and how they gauge its potential to cause 
disruption. 
The intersection of the First Amendment and the Internet 
has created new challenges for educaLors and courts in recent 
years, especially considering technology's potential to develop 
at a faster rate than the law. Accordingly, it may be several 
years before school administrators are given concrete guidance 
regarding the extent to which they may discipline students for 
off-campus cyberspeech. Unfortunately, since the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in Layshock, J.S., and Kowalski, it 
appears that the Court will not be providing clarity to this 
complex issue in the next term. 
manner). 
